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NOTE AND COMMENT
this course of procedure may be followed for the reason that if
the coercive relief be denied the court can still proceed with the
substantive issues and grant a declaration that may for all prac-
tical purposes produce the same result."
Thus, though the declaratory judgment may at first blush
seem only to declare rights, it in reality does much more:
"It enables disputes to be determined in their incipiency
before they have grown into devastating battles .... A de-
cision is obtainable without the prior necessity of a pur-
ported violation of law or precarious leap in the dark.... It
enables the citizen to avoid the extraordinary legal remedies
and injunctions that have accumulated so vast a cargo of
technicalities that the complainant desirous of challenging
an administrative power or privilege finds himself frequent-
ly engulfed in a procedural bog which bars him from his
goal. I pi
"And, most important of all, since no wrong is charged
against the defendant and no damages are asked for, there
is present in most such cases a notable absence of the bit-
terness and hostility frequently present in ordinary damage
suits and the litigants are able to continue their business
relations.' Arthur Martin
"State ex rel. Smith v. Board of Commissioners of Shawnee County,
(1931) 132 Kan. 233, 294 P. 915. (quo warranto plus declaration
asked; quo warranto denied, declaration granted.)
In a case where the sewer of a municipal corporation emptied into
that of another under an agreement held ultra vires, the court con-
sidered the great inc6nvenience of suddenly closing a sewer in daily
use and refused the injunction, but declared the plaintiff's right to
relief with leave to apply for an injunction after a reasonable time,
should the defendant fail to make other arrangements. Islington Ves-
try v. Hornsey U. D. C, C. A. (1900) 1 Ch. 695.
uBorchard, op. cit. supra note p. XV.
"4Potts, op. cit. supra note 36, p. 326.
MONTANA AND THE FEDERAL JUDGMENT LIEN
Does the judgment of a federal court rendered in Mon-
tana become a lien as soon as docketed by the clerk of the
Federal court? Must a title searcher in Montana go to the
office of the Federal District Court to be sure there is no
judgment lien against his property? These questions indicate
the murky' atmosphere surrounding Federal judgment liens
in this state since the decision of Rhea v Smith.'
'WEnsTER's Nuw INTzRNAnONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1940) dark; ob-
scure; thick or impenetrable.
2Rhea v. Smith (1927) 47 S. Ct. 698, 274 U. S. 434, 71 L. Ed. 1139.
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Such judgment liens do have a common law background;
but today "A judgment or execution lien is regarded as cre-
ated, not by the act of the parties, but by operation of law
... . Consequently, such liens are creatures of statutory pro-
visions, owe their life and force entirely to legislation, and
do not exist except by their authority."' Therefore this study
requires a reference to various state and federal statutes. As
a result of the "Process Acts" of Congress and other acts
(1789, 1792, 1828, 1840)' the judgments of federal courts were
held to be liens wherever similar state court judgments were
liens within the state of rendition. These Acts do not indicate
an intent of Congress to place federal court judgments in a
more favorable position than state court judgments; but in-
stead show that
". ... in this, as in all other matters relating to the
practice and proceedings for obtaining and enforcing
judgments in the federal courts, it has always been the
policy of Congress to conform the processes in the federal
courts to those in the state courts." 5
Nevertheless, the decisions interpreting the above named
Acts raised several questions. The most important of these
was the territorial extent of the federal judgment lien. Al-
though several cases stated that the lien of a federal judg-
ment was a lien throughout the state, whether the state consti-
tuted one or more federal districts,' the generally accepted
principle is that stated in the leading case of Massinghil v
Downs':
"In those States where the judgment on the execution of
the State court creates a lien only within the county in
which the judgment is entered, it has not been doubted
that a similar proceeding in the Circuit Court (now Dis-
trict Court) of the United States would create a lien to
the extent of its jurisdiction."
'31 AM. Jun. Judgments See. 302.
'Note: 47 L. R. A. 470, statutes and cases there cited.
'Dartmouth Savings Bank v. Bates (C. C. D. Kans. 1890) 44 Fed. 547.
'Manhattan Co. v. Evertson (N. Y. Ch. 1937) 6 Paige 457; Prevost v.
Gorrell (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1877) 19 Fed. Cas. No. 11,400; Edwards,
FEDEuAL COURT JUDGMENT LmNs, 6 WASH. L. REV. 49, 54.
'Massinghill v. Downs (1849) 7 How. 766, 12 L. Ed. 903. In accord
with that decision, Shrew v. Jones, 22 Fed. Cas. No. 12,818 (C.C. D.Ind.
1840) ; Ludlow v. Clinton Line R. R. (C.C. N.D. Ohio 1861) 15 Fed.
Cas. No. 8,600; Ward v. Chamberlain (U.S. 1862) 2 Black 430; Car-
roll v. Watkins (D.C. S.D. Miss. 1870) 5 Fed. Cas. 2,547; United States
v. Humphreys (C.C. E.D. Va. 1879) 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,422; Evans,
THE LiEN O A FEDE.AL JUDGMENT, 6 Mo. L. Rzv. 297, 30.
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This century-old principle is still a controlling factor in recent
decisions.
However the inherent injustice of automatically extend-
ing the federal judgment lien to the limits of the territorial
jurisdiction, while a state judgment lien was normally limited
to a county, is and was apparent.
"This rule resulted in giving suitors in the federal courts
a preference over those in the state courts as to the terri-
torial extent of the lien, and worked a hardship on the
citizens generally. The mass of the people relied confi-
dently on the records in the clerk's office of their county
disclosing all judgments that were liens on property in the
county. Most people were ignorant of the all prevading
lien of a judgment in a federal court, and they bought and
sold lands on the faith of what the county records dis-
closed. The result was that cases of great hardship
occurred.'
Clearly the result is not conformity of state and federal pro-
cesses, the stated aim of the Federal legislation."
II
In this state of the law, on August 1, 1888, Congress en-
acted the following statute :1"
"Judgments and decrees rendered in a district court of
the United States within any State, shall be liens on
property throughout such State in the same manner and
to the same extent and under the same conditions only
as if such judgments and decrees had been rendered by a
court of general jurisdiction of such State. Whenever
the laws of any State require a judgment or decree of a
State court to be registered, recorded, docketed, indexed,
or any other thing to be done, in a particular manner,
or in a certain office or county, or parish in the State of
Louisiana before a lien shall attach, this section and sec-
tion 813 of this chapter shall be applicable therein when-
ever the laws of such State shall authorize the judgments
and decrees of the United States courts to be registered,
recorded, docketed, indexed, or otherwise conformed to
the rules and requirements relating to the judgments and
decrees of the courts of the State.' ' u
'Dartmouth Savings Bank v. Bates, note 5 supra.
ONote 5, supra."25 Stat. 357 (1888), 37 Stat. 311 (1912), 28 U.S.C.A. §812; hereinafter
referred to as the Act of 18M8.
"As stated in 28 U.S.C. §812 (1934), 4 Fed. Stat. Ann. (2d ed.) 608,
and 25 U.S. Stat. 357, the words underlined in the following quotation
3
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This act resulted in a state's being able to limit the territorial
extent of the federal judgment lien in two ways: (1) by re-
fraining from requiring "a judgment or decree of a state
court to be registered, docketed, indexed, or any other thing
to be done, in a particular manner"; or (2) by enacting re-
quirements as conditions precedent to establishing a state judg-
ment lien, and also a conformity statute authorizing "the
judgments and decrees of the United States courts to be
registered, recorded, docketed, indexed, or otherwise con-
formed to the rules and requirements relating to the judg-
ments and decrees of the courts of the State."
It must be remembered that Congress could not order the
states to conform to a certain pattern, for ". . . . the power
of Congress was not adequate to the task of extending the
territorial operation of a judgment lien in the mode provided
by state laws for a judgment in the state court . . . . But it
was entirely competent for the state to require her clerks to
perform this service ....
As the only United Supreme Court interpretation of the
Act of 1888, Rhea v Smith' deserves careful consideration. The
facts were such that if a judgment rendered by a District
Court of the United States" were a lien on the debtor's land
in the county of rendition, without the filing of a transcript
of the judgment with the clerk of the state court for that
county, then Rhea was entitled to recover. The Missouri
statutes' attempting to comply with the Congressional Act
of 1888, as pertinent to this discussion, provided that: (1)
judgments obtained within any Federal court in Missouri shall
upon filing of a transcript in the office of the clerk of any
state circuit court" become a lien on the real estate located
within the county of filing; and (2) judgments rendered by
any state court of record shall be a lien from the day of rendi-
tion. The supreme court held that these Missouri statutes
failed to show the uniformity required by the Federal Act
are added: ". . . by a court of general jurisdiction of such state:
Provided, that whenever the laws of any state ...... The difference
In wording appears immaterial.
'2Dartmouth Savings Bank v. Bates, note 5, supra, p. 549. In accord:
Lineker v. Dillon (D.C. N.D. Calif. 1921) 275 Fed. 460; Cooke v. Avery
(1893) 13 S.Ct. 340, 147 U.S. 375, 37 L.Ed. 209.
"Note 2, supra.
"District Court, So. Div. of Western District of Missouri.
'°Mo. Rev. 1919 §§1554, 1555, 1556.
" The court of original jurisdiction in Missouri; i.e., the equivalent of
Montana's district court.
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of 1888. The holding of the court in its narrow sense cannot be
easily attacked, but further discussion is enlightening.
The court referred to Massinghill v Downs which stated
that Federal court judgments were liens throughout the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of the Federal courts ;1" and decided that
Congress intended to change or limit that rule
". ... only in those states which passed laws making
the conditions of crektion, scope, and territorial applica-
tion of the liens of Federal court judgments the same as
state court judgments, so that where any state has not
passed such laws, the rule that Federal judgments are liens
throughout the territorial jurisdiction of such courts must
still be in force.' '
This sentence is the crux of the decision, and a very question-
able one. For careful reading of the Congressional Act of
1888 fails to show one word conditioning the applicability of
the Act on whether a state statute makes the "conditions of
creation, scope, and territorial application" of a Federal lien
the same as for a state lien.' Such a statement, especially in
referring to "conditions of creation", assumes by it wording
that a state has power to regulate Federal judgment liens;
but Congress, by Art. I, §8, of the Federal Constitution, is the
repository of that power. And it is a fundamental principle
that such power can not be delegated. In addition, the Act
of 1888 shows no intent on the part of Congress to delegate
any such power to the states. The Act only provided for ap-
plication of the Act of 1888 when a state provided equal re-
cording facilities.
Notwithstanding any criticism, the decision is still that
of our Supreme Court; and as such must be followed by the
separate states in its interpretation of the Federal statutes.
The tests in the case to determine the conformity or non-con-
formity of a state statute are best shown by quoting:
(a) "We are dealing here with a question necessarily of
great nicety in determining the effect and the priority of
liens upon real estate, and the subject requires exactness.
Merely approximate conformity with reference to such a
"Note 7, supra.
"Note 2, supra, p. 441.
"For excellent discussions on this problem see Evans, THE LiEN OF A
FEDERAL JUDGMENT 6 Mo. L. REv. 324; Stockton, STATUS OF THE LIEN
OF FEDERAL JUDGMENTS, 15 A.B.A.J. 65; Edwards, FEDERrL COURT
JUDGMENT L l s, 6 WASH. L. REv. 62.
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subject matter will not do, especially where complete
conformity is entirely possible."
(b) "The risk to be run, however, is in the danger that
the agent or attorney of a judgment creditor in the Fed-
eral court may forget to have the judgment transcribed
and filed in the clerk's office of the circuit court of the
county. Such forgetfulness by those charged with the
duty is a factor to be considered and makes a real dif-
ference between the provision for the lien of the Federal
court judgment and the instant attaching of a lien upon
the entry of the state court judgment without further
action. "
(c) "It is the inequality which permits a lien instantly
to attach to the rendition of the judgment without more
in the state court which does not so attach in the Federal
court in the same county that prevents compliance with
the requirement of §1 of the Act of 1888."'
It is apparent from these quotations that the Supreme Court
insists on exact equality, and will not allow even the slightest
advantage in the method of inception of a state lien over a
federal lien.
The court referred to Re Jackson Light & Traction Co.,"
and distinguished the decision on the grounds that the judg-
ments of Federal and state courts became liens from the time
of enrollment in the county, and so there was no advantage as
to a state judgment. However, from the facts of the Jackson
ease it appears that the clerk, as a matter of course,, is re-
quired by Mississippi statutes to enroll all judgments rendered
in the state court. On such facts, it may well be argued that
conformity is lacking, as there is no such requirement of en-
rolling federal judgments. This point is not discussed in
Rhea v Smith, but it is questionable whether this case gives the
"exact conformity" spoken of in that decision.
The Circuit Court of Appeals in 1942 interpreted the
Illinois statutes as providing clear conformity." The statutes"
provided that the judgments and decrees of courts of the
United States, and all writs, returns, and certificates may be
"registered, recorded, docketed, indexed, or otherwise dealt
with, in the public offices of this state . . ."; and in addition
that the judgments of United States courts shall be a lien in
the same manner as state judgments. The Illinois legislature
"Note 2, supra, pp. 442, 443, 444; (a), (b), and (c) are this writer's
designation.
-(C.C.A. 5th 1920) 269 Fed. 223.
"Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Maley (C.C.A. 7th 1942) 125 F. 2d 181
"Par. 69, e0a, Chap. 77, Illinois Revised Statutes, 1989.
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is to be complimented for passing statutes so clearly in
conformity with the decision of Rhea v. Smith.
The Federal District Court in Missouri," in a matter of
historical interest, ruled that the Missouri statutes, revised
since shown to be not in conformity in the Rhea v. Smith decision,
were now in proper conformity with the Act of 1888. However,
the decision is only dictum as to the statutes involved in Rhea
v Smith. Several other cases have decided the state statutes
involved were in conformity," but none of these have any par-
tieular bearing on this article.
The result of the decision in Rhea v Smith was and still is
considerable confusion in the different states. In 1928, after
Rhea v Smith, Parsons made an excellent study of the statutes
in each of the forty-eight states. His conclusion was that
twenty-five states had statutes in conformity, twenty-two had
statutes not in conformity, and one state was in doubt. Glen,
in 1931," stated that some twenty odd states were in default
in adopting legislation. It is interesting to notice that by
1938 Patton indicates that thirty-five states had established
the conformity needed to come under the Act of 1888; eight
states having statutes of questionable conformity, and five
states having no provisions which would all the Act of 1888
to apply. These articles clearly indicate the varied state in-
terpretations of the conformity required by the Act of 1888,
both before and after Rhea v Smith.'
III
Having discussed the interpretations of the Act of 1888,
let us consider the question of the conformity of the Montana
statutes. Montana code sections are:
R.C.M. 1935 §9410: "Immediately after filing the judg-
ment-roll, the clerk must make the proper entries of the
judgment, under appropriate heads, in the docket kept
by him; and from the time the judgment is docketed it
becomes a lien upon all real property of the judgment
debtor not exempt from execution in the county, owned
2 In re B. P. UIentz Mfg. Co. (D.C.W.D. Mo.W.D. 1940) 32 Fed. Supp.
233.
'R.athbone v. Kimball (1928) 117 Neb. 229, 220 N.W. 244; B. A. Lott
Inc. v. Padgett (Fla. 1943) 14 So. 2d 667.
"Pam-Ona , THE LIn OF FEDERAL COURT JUDGMENTS, 21 Law. & Bank. 349.
=GLEN, FRAunuizNr CoNvANcas (1931) §23, p. 38.
"PATTON ON TiTLES 1356, p. 1051.
"The discussions of these authors pertaining to the conformity of the
Montana statutes will be considered In section III of this article.
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by him at the time, or which. he may afterward acquire,
until the lien ceases. The lien continues for six years,
unless the judgment be previously satisfied."
R.C.M. 1935 §9413: "A transcript of the original docket,
certified by the clerk, may be filed with the district court
clerk of any other county, and from the time of the filing
the judgment becomes a lien upon all the real property
of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, in
such county, owned by him at the time, or which he may
afterward, and before the lien expires, acquire. The lien
continues for six years, unless the judgment be previously
satisfied."
R.C.M. 1935 §9415: "A transcript of the original docket
of any judgment rendered in the circuit or district court
of the United States, ninth circuit, district of Montana,
certified by the clerk of said court, may be filed with
the district court clerk of any county, and from the time
of the filing the judgnpent becomes a lien upon all real
property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execu-
tion, in such county, owned by him at the time, or which
he may afterward, and before the lien expires, acquire.
The lien shall continue for six years, unless the judgment
be previously satisfied."
The Montana Supreme Court has held" that notwithstanding
the code provisions which provide for recording final judg-
ments, or certified copies thereof, in the office of the county
recorder," thereby imparting constructive notice to lienholders;
still R.C.M. 1935 §9410 declares positively that a lien exists
from the time of docketing the judgment." In the same way
the Montana court held that "The mere rendition of a judgment
creates no lien,'" and again stated that docketing of the judg-
ment is necessary to so create a lien.
In 1910 the Circuit Court of Appeals" held that what is now
R.C.M. 1935 §9410' applied to the judgments of federal courts;
that is, that a federal court judgment became a lien as soon as
docketed by the clerk of the federal court. The decision appears
in conflict with R.C.M. 1935 §9415 quoted above, but in actual-
ity such is not the case. For R.C.M. 1935 §9415 was not en-
acted until 1907, and therefore had no effect on the federal
"Gaines v. Van Demark (1937) 106 Mont. 1, 74 P. 2d 454.
'R.C.M. 1935 §§4801 and 4802.
'In accord: Sklower v. Abbott (1897) 19 Mont. 228, 47 P. 901; Butte
Hardware Co. v. Frank (1901) 25 Mont. 344, 65 P. 1; McMillan v.
Davenport (1911) 44 Mont. 23, 118 P. 756.
'Wyman v. Jensen (1901) 26 Mont. 227, 67 P. 114.
"Great Falls Nat. Bank v. McClure (C.C.A. 9th 1910) 176 Fed. 208.
3'Then termed Rev. C. 1907 §6807.
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judgment in question, which was rendered in 1902. Therefore,
though cited in some articles,' it seems this decision should be
disregarded in considering the question of the conformity of
the present Montana statutes.
These decisions of Montana and Federal courts furnish
very little guidance on the question of the conformity of Mon-
tana statutes under the Act of 1888. They only settle the
question of the necessity of docketing a judgment before a lien
will attach in Montana.
The authors referred to in the preceding section" are not in
accord in their views on the Montana statutes. Patton states
that inasmuch as the judgments of both state and federal courts
become liens, either within or without the county in which
rendered, by docketing in the office of the district court clerk
of the county, there is the conformity required by the Act of
1888.8
However, it appears to this writer that the above opinions
were given without sufficient study of Rhea v Smith and the
Montana codes. There is little debate: (1) That R.C.M. 1935
§9410 requires a docketing of the state judgment in the county
of rendition before it becomes a lien, and that R.C.M. 1935 §9413
requires the filing of a transcript of the original docket to
establish a lien in a county other thon the county of rendition;
(2) That R.C.M. 1935 §9415 gives permission to file a tran-
script of the original docket of any Federal court judgment
with Montana district court clerk of any county and from the
time of filing it becomes a lien; (3) That these code sections
indicate apparent conformity between state and federal
judgments.
However, let us consider the other pertinent Montana
statutes. R.C.M. 1935 §§9403 and 9407 make it the duty of the
clerk to enter judgment within twenty-four hours after the
rendition of the verdict in the judgment book. R.C.M. 1935
§9409 makes it the duty of the clerk, immediately after entering
the judgment, to file certain papers, which constitute the judg-
ment-roll. And R.C.M. 1935 §9410 as stated before, makes it
the additional duty of the clerk, immediately after filing the
judgment-roll, to enter the judgment in the docket. At this time
if it is the judgment of a Montana court, it becomes a lien.
"Note 26, supra, p. 365.
"'Note 29, supra.
"Note 28, supra, p. 1053.
0in accord: Parsons, THE LIEN OF FEDERAL COURT JUDGm[ETS, note 26.
supra.
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As a result the judgment of a Montana court becomes a
lien because of a series of statutory duties imposed on the clerk
of court, regardless of any non-action on the part of the judg-
ment creditor or his attorney. Yet, under R.C.M. 1935 §9415,
such non-action on the part of the judgment creditor or his
attorney where a Federal court judgment is involved, results in
the judgment's failing to become a lien. The statute specifies
that the creditor or his attorney must file a transcript of the
Federal judgment docket with a Montana district court clerk
before the judgment becomes a lien. Test (b) under Rhea v
Smit" indicates the danger that a judgment creditor or his
attorney may forget to file a transcript in the clerk of the state
court's office, thus failing to create a lien. The Supreme
Court indicates that such a possibility "makes a real differ-
ence. "
It is this writer's opinion that the Montana statutes provide
for only ". . . . approximate conformity . . . where complete
conformity is entirely possible'"; and so are not in sufficient
conformity with the Act of 1888 to require the filing of any
federal court paper wth a Montana district court clerk before
a lien comes into being."
Even though the above statements are not completely ac-
cepted, the conformity of the Montana Statutes is still in doubt.
It is entirely possible that on review the United States Supreme
Court would hold that such a lack of conformity exists, and as
a result hold that Federal judgments in Montana become a lien
as soon as docketed in the office of the clerk of the Federal
court."
Such a result would be completely contrary to the intent
of the legislators who passed the federal and state statutes.
Their desire was to protect the innocent title searcher and to
increase efficiency by greatly reducing the number of places a
title search must be made.
It is therefore suggested that R.C.M 1935 §§9410, 9413 and
9415 be repealed, and the following statute, basically as pre-
pared by Professor Evans," be substituted:
'Note 20, supra.
"Test (a), note 20, supra.
'2In accord: Haccnz, CONCEnNING RHEA V. SMITH, 22 Law. & Bank.
pp. 35, 43.
Evans, THE ImE OF A FEDERAL JUDGMENT, note 19, supra, p. 317, indi-
cates there is no satisfactory solution as to whether or not Montana
statutes supply the needed conformity.
"Similar result to Rhea v. Smith, note 2 supra.
"Note 5, supra.
Evans, THE LIE OF A FEVDERA JUDGMENT, note 19, supra, p. 328.
10
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"1. The county clerk of every county within this state is
hereby authorized to receive duly authenticated tran-
scripts of the original docket of all judgments and de-
crees rendered by courts of record of this state, and by
courts of the United States held within this state. It shall
be his duty to note upon such transcripts the exact time
and date when they were received, and to enter them
promptly and uniformly in a judgment book, to be kept
for that purpose. He shall also maintain an index to the
judgment book, and shall index the judgments by the
names of every judgment debtor, alphabetized to the letter
of his family name.
"2. Judgments and decrees of courts of record of this
state, and of courts of the United States rendered within
this state, shall be liens upon real estate situated in any
county of this state in which a transcript of the original
judgment docket thereof has been filed with the county
clerk of that county, as above provided. The lien shall
be effective from the time the transcript is filed with the
county clerk.
"3. Any bona fide purchaser for value of real estate
subject to the lien of a judgment of the courts of this
state or of the United States may maintain an action
against the county clerk of any county for damages suf-
fered because of the delay of said county clerk in entering
and indexing said judgment."
Note that this proposed statute requires recording in the
county clerk's office. In this way there is no possibility of
favoring state over federal judgments as the present Montana
statutes appear to- do. And in addition this puts the record of
judgment liens with other records of title-in the county clerk
and recorder's office, and thus provides greater convenience
and protection for the innocent title searcher."
Calif. Code Civ. Proc. 674 provides for recording an ab-
stract of the judgment of a state or federal court with the
county recorder at which time the lien is acquired. This
statute seems to show the conformity required under the Act
of 1888; but does not fit in with the remainder of the Mon-
tana code provisions as well as the statute quoted above.
Therefore it is respectfully suggested that the Legisla-
ture of the State of Montana might well enact a statute such
4Should such a statute be adopted in Montana, it would be necessary to
change R.C.M. 1935 J9414 to provide for recording a satisfaction of
judgment in the county clerk's office.
11
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as the one above quoted, before a case of great hardship oc-




"As the justice courts of Montana are not courts of original jurisdic-
tion, the code provisions referring to their judgments are not im-
portant in a consideration of the Congressional Act of 1888.
However R.C.M. 1935 §9690 permits the filing of the abstract of
judgment of a justice court in the office of the clerk of the district
court. R.C.M. 1935 §9692 indicates that from the time of filing of the
abstract of judgment, a judgment rendered in a justice's court becomes
a lien upon all real property of the judgment debtor in the county,
with certain exemptions. It is therefore possible in Montana to create
a real property lien by the proper filing of a justice court judgment.
LIBEL PER BE - OR NO LIBEL
Plaintiff sued for libel upon a publication without al-
leging special damages and rested his case on the contention
that the newspaper article was actionable per se, then by
innuendo attempted to show its damaging character. It was
held among other reasons, that unless the words are actionable
per se, special damages must be proven, and "For the words to
be actionable per se their injurious character must be a fact
of such common notoriety as to be established by the general
consent of men so that the court takes judicial notice of it."
Griffin v. Opinion Publishing Company.'
Under Montana's interpretation of its statute,' unless a
publication is libelous per se, the complaint must to state a cause
of action for libel, allege special damages.' As used by our
court, "The term 'per se' means by itself; simply as such; in
its own nature without reference to its relations. The words
used in the libelous article must be susceptible of but one
meaning to constitute libel per se.'" Thus, we have in effect
a doctrine which distinguishes between words that convey a
defamatory meaning on their face, and, on the other hand,
words of veiled detraction whose offense is apparent only
1(1943) 114 Mont. 502, 138 P. (2nd) 580.
'R.C.M. 1935, §5690. Libel defined. Libel is a false and unprivileged
publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed repre-
sentation to the eye. which exposes any person to hatred, contempt,
ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or
which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation.
'Brown v. Independent Pub. Co. (1914) 48 Mont. 374, 138 P. 258; Lem-
ner v. The '"Tribune" (1915) 50 Mont. 559, 148 P. 338.
'Woolston v. Montana Free Press (1931) 90 Mont. 299, 2 P. (2d) 1020.
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